What kind of tari¤ reform is likely to raise welfare in situations where tari¤ revenue is important?
What kind of tari¤ reform is likely to raise welfare in situations where tari¤ revenue is important? Uncertainty about the proper speci…cation of the economy and risk from imprecise estimates of parameters of any particular speci…cation combine to make it very di¢ cult to provide believable con…-dence intervals for simulation estimates of the e¤ects of reform proposals. A promising alternative is to set out reform rules which are robust with respect to uncertainty. But past e¤orts to formulate rules in the face of highly differentiated tari¤ structures and unknown substitution e¤ects have met little progress. This paper presents su¢ cient conditions for a wide class of operational linear rules which guarantee welfare improving tari¤ reform under limited information about the economy. The rules span cones of welfare improving tari¤ reforms. Remarkably, we provide a scienti…c justi…cation (in plausible special circumstances) for the World Bank's long standing recommendation for dispersion cuts which lower high tari¤s and raise low tari¤s. Most remarkably, the su¢ cient condition for welfare-improving dispersion cuts encompasses the many household case: such cuts are Pareto-superior.
Replacing border taxes with domestic consumption taxation is often advocated.
1 Anderson (1999) shows that gradual reform of this type need not improve welfare when uniform radial reductions are used to lower tari¤s. The present paper admits a much broader class of trade reforms when domestic consumption taxation is the alternative revenue source and provides more optimistic prospects for tari¤ reform which reduces dispersion.
An extensive literature has considered welfare improving tari¤ reform when tari¤ revenue is not important. Recent extensions (Anderson and Neary, 2005) develop new techniques to derive 'cones of liberalization'. These techniques derive from a decomposition of the e¤ect of tari¤ changes into their e¤ect on the generalized mean and generalized variance of tari¤s, both of which are negatively related to welfare. Since linear paths can be speci…ed which lower either mean or variance, convex combinations of these paths will also be welfare improving. In particular, dispersion reduction looks promising. The setup of the literature and of the Anderson-Neary analysis presumes, however, that any lost tari¤ revenue can be replaced with nondistortionary taxation. Where tari¤ revenue considerations are impor-tant, the applicability of the new insights remains questionable. This paper combines elements of the Anderson-Neary and Anderson techniques to characterize welfare-improving tari¤ reform where revenue must be made up with distortionary taxation.
Section 1 sets up the model. Section 2 analyzes trade reform and derives the main results of the paper. Section 3 extends the results to the case of many households. Section 4 analyzes consumption and production taxation. Section 5 concludes.
The Setup
A small open economy raises its revenue with a set of tari¤s and with a wage tax. The wage tax is distortionary because labor supply is variable (due to household choice in an economy where immigration is shut down) and leisure cannot be taxed. Tari¤s and the wage tax are initially set suboptimally. The objective of the reform to move the taxes gradually toward their optimal (Ramsey) values. This section …rst describes the economy and then turns to main job of the paper, the analysis of gradual reform of taxes.
The representative consumer's net expenditure function is given e( ; w; u). u is the real income of the representative consumer, is the vector of traded goods prices and w is the wage rate. By Shephard's Lemma, e w gives labor supply while e gives the vector of …nal demand for traded goods. The aggregate pro…t function is given by g( ; w + t; v), where t is the tax on labor income. By Hotelling's Lemma, the vector of supply of traded goods (or where appropriate, minus the demand for traded inputs) is given by g and g w gives labor demand. The trade expenditure function for this economy is de…ned by
E gives the net transfer to the private sector needed to support utility u when domestic prices of traded goods are set at and the wage tax is set at t. The de…nition embeds labor market clearance in the background. Hotelling's and Shehard's Lemmas imply that E is the vector of excess demand for traded goods. By construction, E t = g w , the labor demand. Since e( ; w; u) and g( ; w) are homogeneous of degree one in ; w, E is homogeneous of degree one in ( ; t).
2 Since e g is concave in ( ; w; t), E( ; t; u) is concave in ( ; t).
2 E = e + e w w g g w w = E + g w t:
2
The private budget constraint is:
Here, s is the transfer from the government to the private sector. The government budget constraint expresses the requirement that a given amount of revenue must be raised net of subsidies. Taxes are collected on tradable goods at rates and on labor at the rate t. Here denotes the …xed vector of world prices of the taxed tradable goods. The government budget constraint is given by:
The gradual reform problem is to determine welfare-improving directions of change in the set of reformable tari¤s, equivalent to varying while at the same time not decreasing revenue. One class of reforms takes the wage tax as given and examines tari¤ reform that raises both welfare and revenue.
A more ambitious class of tari¤ reforms permits the wage tax to vary endogenously in order to maintain government revenue. To exactly maintain revenue, t must change to o¤set the movement in : Along the government budget constraint, this implies the endogenous wage tax function t( ; u; s; R 0 ) = t : R(t; ; u; s) = R 0 : In contrast, the standard analysis of tari¤ reform in the trade literature (see Anderson and Neary, 2005 , for a recent statement) assumes that any revenue change is lump sum transferred between private and government budgets. Thus the government budget constraint can be solved for s with the result substituted into the private constraint to form the social budget constraint.
Tari¤ Changes Only
Di¤erentiating the private budget constraint (2) with respect to yields:
Di¤erentiating the government budget constraint (3) and using E d to substitute for E u du yields:
The square bracket term is equal to 1 R I where R I denotes the derivative of revenue with respect to nominal income given the tax structure. This is ordinarily positive. A host of arguments has been raised in the literature to defend this presumption. Normality su¢ ces, as does a standard stability condition. Violation of the defense would be perverse indeed since it implies that a gift of foreign exchange to the private sector, enabling a rise in real income, would at constant prices make government revenue fall. In the presence of lump sum redistribution, moreover, this would imply that gifts make the economy worse o¤.
The …rst term of (5) reveals the tension between private and public spending: more for the government means less for the private sector. The second term can, however, be positive by enough to o¤set the …rst term, permitting a rise in both real income and revenue. This possibility arises from reforms that remove ine¢ ciency in the tari¤ structure. Below, we characterize such possibilities in terms of tari¤ moments.
Tari¤ and Wage Tax Changes
It is convenient in the endogenous wage tax case to consider the cost to the government of supporting real income u when the exogenous instruments are ; s: This government cost function G is obtained by substituting the endogenous wage tax function into the private budget constraint, yielding E[ ; t( ; u; s; R 0 ); u] s G( ; u; s; R 0 ): The reduced form social budget constraint is given by G( ; u; s; R 0 ) = 0:Welfare improves if directions of change d are found for which the reduced form social budget constraint permits higher real income. Di¤erentiating the government cost function, the relationship between d and du is given by
The concept of the Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF) greatly aids the analysis of gradual reform. The MCF of using t to raise revenue is de…ned as E t =R t : raising a dollar of revenue R by a small change in t imposes a cost on the consumer per dollar raised equal to E t =R t :
The di¤erential of the reduced form social budget constraint can now usefully be rewritten replacing t with R =R t and t u with R u =R t :
where R I R u =E u ; the derivative of revenue with respect to nominal income. Multiplying and dividing R by corresponding elements of E ; and using the de…nition of MCF for elements of (M CF i E i =R i ); the di¤erential of the reduced form social budget constraint becomes:
The implication of (6) is that reducing all elements i associated with M CF i > M CF t and increasing all elements for which the inequality is reversed will produce a surplus. The surplus applied to the right hand side causes an increase in real income, provided that the square bracket term on the right is positive. Provided that t is appropriately chosen to fall on an activity with low MCF, the positive sign of 1 M CF t R I is plausible. 3 It is often claimed that labor supply has low elasticity, hence low M CF t is plausible.
Tari¤ Reform
The tari¤ reform problem is to advise on directions of change of tari¤s from initial values. Full optimization is not feasible, for reasons which are not relevant to the analysis, by assumption.
To make progress with the revenue tari¤ advice problem it is necessary for the analyst to have at least some information. We seek to characterize cones of welfare-improving tari¤ reform that are su¢ cient with minimal information conditions. The information set includes the knowledge that the economy has a price-taking representative agent with convex technology and preferences and performs with no distortions other than those of taxes. The information set also includes some knowledge about speci…cation and its implications that is spelled out below. This knowledge may include whether tari¤s are on average over or under-utilized, in the sense that a uniform absolute tari¤ change (that preserves domestic relative prices) has a marginal cost M CF T which is greater or less than the alternative source of funds M CF t : Initial tari¤s are set such that domestic prices are given by A : Optimal revenue tari¤s imply prices X : These are associated with points A and X respectively in Figure 1 . The iso-value locus G through point A is drawn such that G( ; u A ) is convex in : It has upward slope as drawn but this is neither necessary to the analysis nor particularly to be expected. The full locus G is an iso-value contour surrounding X which for simplicity we may consider to enclose a convex set. The tari¤ reform problem is to set out rules which will improve welfare under minimal information. We seek directions of change for that lower G:
The key intermediate step in the analysis of trade reform is a decomposition of the e¤ect of tari¤ changes into their e¤ect on two moments of the distribution of tari¤s, the generalized mean and the generalized variance. Anderson and Neary (2005) examine welfare improving directions of tari¤ reform in the case where revenue considerations are unimportant, e¤ectively M CF t = 1. The moments decomposition technique is applied here to the revenue tari¤ problem.
The setup begins with de…ning tari¤s on the domestic price base:
The analog for the wage tax is T w = t=(w + t) The generalized mean tari¤ T is de…ned by T 0 ST; the generalized variance is de…ned by V (T T ) 0 S(T T ) and the positive de…nite weighting matrix S is de…ned by S s 1 0 E where s 0 E > 0 is the normalization coe¢ cient for the substitution e¤ects matrix and is the vector of ones. The normalization implies that 0 S = 1: The trade weighted average tari¤ is de…ned as
Notice that whereas T a > 0 so long as imports are not heavily subsidized, the generalized mean tari¤ need not necessarily be positive even with all positive tari¤s. A negative generalized mean is surely a perverse case, however, since it can be shown that T < 0 ( ())M CF T < 1 provided the composite commodity of the goods is a substitute (complement) for the labor. 4 T < 0 is necessary and su¢ cient in the borderline case of zero cross e¤ects. If T < 0, replacing lump sum taxes with a uniform absolute rise in tari¤s would be welfare increasing. Being able to assume a positive generalized mean turns out to be crucially important for the assessment of the welfare implications of tari¤
T +tEt =E 0 . Substitutability/complementarity in the text above is de…ned in terms of E t , where
g w e ww g ww :
6 changes when information is limited. In the remainder of this paper we assume that the generalized mean tari¤ is positive. As for changes in trade policy, we de…ne the changes in tari¤ moments as based on constant weights, dT 0 SdT and dV 2T 0 SdT 2T dT : These expressions, while intuitive, are not directly useful because they depend on unobservables. Nevertheless, analytic expressions in changes in generalized means and variances help formulate linear tari¤ change rules that are suf…cient for welfare improvement even in the absence of detailed information about substitution e¤ects.
An important special case of preferences or technology provides a very illuminating and convenient illustration of the generalized moments. Suppose that the group of goods with price vector enters either preferences or technology separably, so that E( ; w; u) = F [ ( ); w; u]. The function ( ) is concave and homogeneous of degree one. Separability is a very common assumption in applied work with both econometric and simulation modeling. Within the full general equilibrium model above, separability is very stringent, but the appendix shows that all our present argument can be applied to any separable group while more general substitution possibilities continue to govern relationships between groups.
Lemma Under separable preferences or technology as de…ned above,
For the separable case, using the homogeneity of ;
and therefore:
This development generalizes Anderson and Neary (2005) , who showed that T = T a in a special case where tari¤ed imports were …nal goods imperfectly substitutable with domestic production and preferences were CES. Separability is a considerably weaker su¢ cient condition.
Tari¤ Changes Only
With tari¤ reform restricted to tari¤ changes only, the task is to …nd directions of improvement that raise welfare and/or revenue without lowering either one. Using the di¤erentials of the private and government budget constraints:
The familiar case of lump sum redistribution results when dR = 0and the two equations above imply
See Anderson and Neary (2005) for more development of this case. Without redistribution, the …rst equation implies that the change in money metric utility as a percent of trade expenditure is equal to minus the change in the trade weighted average tari¤. The second equation reveals that revenue must fall with a fall in T a , unless compensated by changes in the other tari¤ moments. What type of tari¤ structure changes can induce both welfare and revenue to rise? 5 Reductions in the generalized variance must always increase revenue, all else equal. Mean-preserving reductions in dispersion are thus attractive if it is feasible to preserve all three means (T a ; T ; T ). When the group of tari¤-ridden goods being reformed enters preferences or technology separably, the three …rst moments are all equal, using the Lemma and a similar proof that 6 Then under separability, trade-weighted average tari¤ preserving cuts in dispersion will raise revenue.
Apart from separability, a useful benchmark cut in tari¤ means that preserves dispersion is the uniform absolute reduction reform
When T and R I are large and T w is small, uniform absolute reductions in tari¤s will raise revenue and welfare at the same time.
Pulling together results: Proposition 1 (a) Under separability, trade weighted average preserving cuts in tari¤ dispersion raise revenue while not harming welfare. (b) Uniform absolute reductions in T raise both welfare and revenue when 1 R I (T ) T w < 0.
Considering that very large dispersion is common in tari¤ structures, even in countries that raise a substantial portion of government revenue from tari¤s, the proposition does imply considerable scope for e¢ ciency improvement from dispersion cuts. Combining uniform absolute tari¤ cuts with dispersion cuts gives further scope for tari¤ reform that both raises welfare and revenue.
Tari¤ Reform with Wage Tax Changes
Tari¤ reform advice has more scope for e¢ ciency gains when the wage tax t can be changed so as to hold revenue constant. Advice remains problematic because information about the derivative vector G is limited. The information constraint boils down to the analyst not knowing the expected values and standard errors of MCF's of the various tari¤s. What rules can be derived which are robust to the analyst's restricted information about the MCF's of individual tari¤s?
As a preliminary step, an important benchmark MCF for reformable tari¤s overall is associated with a uniform proportional exogenous change in the domestic price of tari¤-ridden goods, d = d ; where d is a scalar. This case preserves the dispersion of the tari¤ schedule but reduces the average (with any set of weights) tari¤ by d . In this case the change in the government cost, the left hand side of (6), G 0 d ; reduces to
By the composite commodity theorem, the group of tari¤ ridden goods is treated as if it were one good when prices move equiproportionately, with composite marginal cost of funds equal to M CF T : Another important benchmark is optimality, the solution to the Ramsey problem. This requires that the MCF be equal for all , and equal to the MCF for the alternative source of tax revenue, in this case the wage tax. Now we take up the analysis of tari¤ reform using the tari¤ moment de…-nitions. Any change in domestic prices due to tari¤ changes, d ; changes the policy objective by dG via terms which can be decomposed into generalized tari¤ moments and their changes.
For general tari¤ changes d that are made revenue neutral by endogenous changes in the wage tax t, the change in the government cost as a proportion of the domestic value of good trade is given by:
The …rst term of (7) is decreasing in the trade weighted mean tari¤s assuming that M CF t > 1. This term gives the revenue e¤ect of the tari¤ change at constant quantities demanded, without substitution e¤ects. The second term gives the e¤ect of tari¤ changes acting through within-group substitution e¤ects, all multiplied by ; the own elasticity of the group with respect to an equiproportionate change in . It is increasing in the generalized variance and mean of tari¤s, provided T > 0. The third term gives the cross e¤ect on revenue as due to a 'cross-e¤ect weighted average tari¤ change' multiplied by the cross elasticity of demand between the p good and the group of goods.
What combinations of assumed information and rules for tari¤ changes are likely to improve welfare by reducing G? The general expression (7) provides useful clues. First, variance reduction is useful, all else equal. Second, uniform absolute reductions in T (dT = d where is the vector of ones) preserve relative prices among the goods. This results in
A necessary condition for M CF T > 1 is T > T w : This is assumed for tari¤ reform to make any sense at all, otherwise a tari¤ increase is more e¢ cient than a lump sum tax. The analyst may also have con…dence that M CF t =M CF T < 1; a tari¤ is less e¢ cient than the alternative distortionary tax, based on simulation exercises with a number of countries and simulation models. For more general results that can cover more of the complexity of actual tari¤ changes, it is very helpful to restrict tari¤ changes to linear paths, dT = (T )d : A rise in will raise variance and will raise T a if T a : Linear paths have simple relationships to the generalized mean and variance of tari¤s. The general linear path is a combination of uniform absolute and uniform proportional changes in tari¤s. It is also a convex combination of uniform absolute tari¤ changes and trade weighted mean preserving variance changes. 7 On the linear path
Then using M CF T > 1 and additionally supposing that T T ; the second line must be positive. Welfare rises with cuts in if dG=d > 0: Then setting the tari¤ change rule such that T a = ; dG=d > 0 whenever T T T a = : Proposition 2 (i) Trade-weighted mean preserving reductions in tari¤ variance are welfare improving when T T T a and M CF T > 1:
(ii) Uniform absolute tari¤ reductions are welfare improving when 1 < M CF t < M CF T ;
(iii) Convex combinations of uniform absolute tari¤ cuts and trade-weighted mean preserving dispersion cuts, T a ; are welfare improving under the conditions of (i) and (ii). Proof: (i) and (ii) have already been proved. Rearrange the right hand side of (8) , dividing by T a > 0 as
The square bracket term is smaller than the inverse of M CF T under the conditions of (i) and hence the entire expression is positive under the condition of (ii).jj
The condition T T T a is problematic, depending on two unobservable average tari¤s. But the condition is met in an important benchmark simpli…cation that yields strikingly simple conclusions. In the separable case, by the Lemma, T = T = T a : Then the proposition holds with separability and the condition of (ii), 1 < M CF t < M CF T : In the future, more insight into the behavior of the unobservables will be generated by examining simulations with a variety of models and data for di¤erent countries.
The separable case shows that mere substitutability is not important in ranking T and T relative to T a : Substitution e¤ects within classes of tari¤-ridden goods are irrelevant, complementarities are admissible along with highly asymmetric substitution e¤ects. For example, it is natural to think of an aggregate like clothing as a goods class, entering preferences separably but having complex substitution e¤ects within class: shirts and trousers may be complements while silk and chambray shirts may be substitutes. What does matter for the ranking is that nonseparability admits varying substitution e¤ects between tari¤-ridden goods and the numeraire. Using the standard algebra of covariance, T T a = Cov(!; T ) Cov(! a ; T ); where the covariance uses arithmetic (equal) weights. The generalized weights ! di¤er from the trade share weights ! a only if the goods are non-separable and T < T a with non-separability if numeraire substitution e¤ect shares ! are more sensitive to high tari¤s than are trade shares ! a : Proposition 2 can readily be extended to many classes of separable tari¤ -ridden goods. Let T ka denote the trade weighted average tari¤ in separable goods class k; while T a continues to denote the overall trade weighted average tari¤ and T continues to denote the overall generalized mean tari¤.
Proposition 3 Welfare improves with (i )trade weighted mean preserving dispersion cuts within separable goods classes, (ii) any convex combination of such dispersion cuts and a uniform absolute tari¤ change across as well as within classes that decreases (increases) tari¤s when they are over (under) utilized.
Proposition 3 is proved in the Appendix. The key element is that the condition of Proposition 2 is met under separability by the lemma. The proposition is quite useful because separability is a ubiquitous assumption in applied work. Faced with some ten thousand tari¤ lines, aggregation is inevitable for any econometric or simulation work. The proposition assures the analyst that trade-weighted average preserving dispersion cuts within classes are welfare improving without detailed knowledge of substitution e¤ects (either parameter values or speci…cation) within goods classes. National tari¤ schedules are full of dispersion in detailed product classes, so there is a lot of room in practice for bene…cial cuts. It is worth noting that under separability, a trade weighted mean-preserving tari¤ dispersion cut improves welfare strictly by raising government revenue; trade expenditure remains constant under this reform.
The separable case restriction yields a directly useful expression for M CF 
How Over-su¢ cient Are the Conditions?
Tari¤ reform within a separable goods class can improve welfare by movements that are not within the cone formed by the su¢ cient conditions of Propositions 2 and 3. Thus it is useful to examine what can be said about MCF's within a class in order to gauge how much of the potential space of welfare improving movements is covered by the cone of Propositions 2 and 3. Imposing zero cross e¤ects ( = 0) for simplicity,
Not much can be done in general with this expression because S has too many variables known imprecisely. Imposing the restriction of separability, E( ; t; u) = F [ ( ; u); t; u] and s= 0 E = F =F = ; the aggregate elasticity of demand. Moreover, S ij = (1= ) i ij j + w a i w a j ; and hence
The third term might be thought 8 
M CF
1 in the general case. Using the de…nitions of generalized moments, this reduces to M CF T = 1 T s= 0 E : With separability, T = T a and s = F 2 while 0 E = F : Substituting into the general case expression yields the simple form in the text.
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to be small because P j ij j = 0 but in some cases it may be large, so this expression remains too general to be useful. Specialization to the CES case produces especially simple results.
The CES expression (9) for MCF reveals that the focus of Propositions 2 and 3 on convex combinations of mean-preserving tari¤ cuts and dispersionpreserving mean cuts does indeed capture all the relevant characteristics of welfare improving revenue tari¤ reform which can be guaranteed without full knowledge of substitution e¤ects. If exact values of and are assumed to be known, it is of course possible to improve welfare with tari¤ reforms outside the cones based on (9). 10 As substitution possibilities range more widely outside the CES, more welfare improving revenue tari¤ reforms can be found which are not within the cones of Propositions 1 and 2. But again, showing that these reforms raise welfare depends on information that this paper assumes, realistically, that the analyst is unlikely ever to have with any certainty.
Note that the CES expression for MCF sheds light on the esoteric possibility that some tari¤s may actually have M CF < 1. The right hand side of (9) can be greater than one (and hence the MCF of tari¤s in good i can be less than one). The necessary and su¢ cient condition for
The su¢ cient condition requires either that = < 1; substitution elasticities within the separable group exceed substitution elasticities between that group and all other goods, or that T i < 0: Normally neither condition would be met. 9 In the CES case,
The half space de…ned by tari¤ changes such that G 0 d < 0 gives the full set of government cost reducing reforms. In the CES case this space is de…ned by tari¤s such that
Mean preserving dispersion cuts reduce government costs, dispersion-preserving mean cuts (uniform absolute cuts) reduce government costs, convex combinations of these also reduce costs. But many other cuts lie in the half space below the constraint. 14 
The Desirability of Dispersion Cuts
Further analysis of the desirability of trade-weighted mean-preserving dispersion cuts is useful, since it seems to argue for uniformity in contrast to the intuition of the Ramsey principle. The su¢ ciency condition T T a appears to be puzzlingly powerful. Figure 1 shows that the ray through the Ramsey optimal tari¤ point X divides the domestic price space into half spaces. Starting at point X, draw a mean-preserving line to uniform tari¤ ray OF. For points on this line between uniform tari¤ ray OF and optimal tari¤ ray OX, trade weighted mean preserving dispersion increases are welfare improving. For points in the space below ray OX, dispersion increases are welfare decreasing. If the cone FOX is small, the World Bank intuition about the desirability of dispersion reduction holds in some sense for most of the tari¤ space.
Next, consider a particular tari¤ A, with iso-value locus G A : The line labeled dT a = 0 gives the mean-preserving tari¤ change path. As drawn, decreases in dispersion raise welfare, implying T > T a : A line tangent to G With separability, T = T a ; hence dG=d > 0 for mean preserving changes in dispersion. This implies that the Ramsey optimal tari¤ is uniform in the separable case (Guesnerie, 1995) . Thus point X lies on OF. Extending separability to multiple classes as in Proposition 3, uniformity of tari¤s within classes is optimal. This benchmark case suggests that optimal departures from uniformity may be small for a fairly wide class of reasonable general equilibrium structures.
The desirability of dispersion cuts becomes less mysterious when we recall that the linear reform rule restricts outcomes relative to the starting point. The full optimum is not attainable. The optimal tari¤ structure implied by the linear reform rule dT = (T )d is, for mean-preserving dispersion changes = T a , consistent with V = T (T T a ): Figure 2 illustrates a case where the mean-preserving dispersion cut line AU is associated with increases in welfare relative to u A for each point on the path to the uniform tari¤ ray OF. Nevertheless, the full optimal tari¤ point X is non-uniform and yields still higher welfare.
11 Moreover, there is a best tari¤ subject to the linear rule and the initial condition T A which lies somewhere on the path from A to U, and this tari¤ is non-uniform unless it lies at U. T < T a is necessary for movement from A to U not to raise welfare relative to u A for each point on the path.
Many Households
The preceding expressions extend with appropriate modi…cation to the case of many households. For simplicity, assume that zero cross e¤ects obtain, = 0: The government budget constraint continues to hold using E for the aggregate trade expenditure function and its derivatives while E i denotes the individual household i trade expenditure function. The aggregate cost function G is is obtained as before: The gradient vector with respect to is given by
Compare to the one household case, aggregate compensated excess demand and expenditure replace the representative agent's excess demand and expenditure. The aggregate expression can be decomposed into N separate expressions G i , one for each of the N households in the economy. Trade reform e¤ects on welfare can be analyzed at the level of each household i. For each household the linear reform rule dT i = (T i )d yields a version of (8):
where
E and the generalized moments are de…ned with substitution e¤ects matrices which are household speci…c.
What minimal information is needed to specify welfare improving rules for each household (Pareto superior rules)? Tari¤s are widely levied on intermediate goods. In this case there is no household-speci…c weighting, T ai = T a ;
11 The optimal tari¤ vector is given by
where all variables are evaluated at the optimal tari¤ point.
so dispersion cuts are Pareto-superior. As for …nal goods, assume that imported goods in a separable goods class have no domestic perfect substitute, and that household expenditure patterns E i are observable. The former is a widely used empirical assumption because the perfect substitutes assumption yields implications wildly at variance with the trade data. The observability of household expenditure patterns is a more problematic assumption but it is satis…ed for a number of countries.
Under these assumptions, the i parameters can be set equal to the household level trade-weighted average tari¤ T ai to implement the mean preserving dispersion cut:
The mechanism is a uniform deviation from the common tari¤ cut rule for each household:
Implementation of the household speci…c deviations could presumably take place at the retail level (as with food stamps or senior citizen discounts), supplemented by some governmental identi…cation system. Doing so, for example, all clothing tari¤s change according to the common rule, then each household receives or pays its household speci…c deviation (T ai T a )d : Alternatively, the implementation could be done through income tax credits. To avoid shirking, the common rule could be set around the highest T ai ; so that all households with lower average tari¤s receive a rebate.
In this scheme of tari¤s, the real income of each household is maintained, the individual variation of i is revenue neutral since
; and the government revenue will rise due to the revenue-increasing cut in dispersion. Thus dispersion cuts are a Pareto-superior reform. As for uniform absolute cuts in tari¤s, the requirement of Propositions 2 and 3 that 'tari¤s are over (under) utilized' becomes extremely stringent because it requires that the MCF of the alternative revenue source be less (more) than each individual agent's MCF of tari¤s. This is seldom likely to appear plausible to analysts evaluating potential reforms.
The implication is that the Pareto-superiority of dispersion cuts holds in the many household case under the separability assumption and zero cross e¤ects, understanding that trade weighted average tari¤s must be calculated and applied at the household level. The separability assumption is plausible for some goods classes and not for others. Still, this discussion suggests the surprisingly wide desirability of dispersion cuts.
Consumption and Production Tax Reform
Standard …scal advice to developing economies urges the replacement of trade taxes with consumption taxes. So in this section we focus on the reform of internal tax/subsidy systems, subject to the revenue constraint. We omit consideration of administrative costs from our analysis (except implicitly insofar as some goods are assumed to be untaxed).
12 Consumption and production taxes and subsidies are a far more prominent source of revenue and expenditure than are trade taxes for most economies, so much of the …xed cost of administration may often be plausibly taken as sunk. Nevertheless, administrative costs may sometimes be a signi…cant consideration in …scal reform. For this section of the paper, we eliminate wage taxation (continuing to push equilibrium wage determination into the background).
It is useful to ground the analysis in the well-known equivalence between a tari¤ and a combination of a tax on consumption and a subsidy on production at the same rate. Similarly, an export tax is equivalent to a tax on production combined with a subsidy on production. Di¤erential tax/subsidy rates for traded goods break the equivalence of a tari¤ with a consumption tax cum production subsidy. In contrast, for nontraded goods a consumption tax and a production tax are equivalent.
Reform can be viewed, when consumption and production policies are uncoupled, as starting from a base with border taxes and possibly additional consumption or production policies, and then adding changes in consumption and production policies separately. We simplify this picture to a typical distortion reform situation which involves consumption taxes and production subsidies at di¤erent rates. The direction of welfare improving change is typically a reform in the consumption tax vector that reduces taxes overall combined with a reform of the subsidy vector that reduces subsidies overall. In keeping with the setup of this paper, the net revenue change must be made up from an alternative revenue source with MCF greater than 1.
The …rst subsection deals with the reform of taxes and subsidies on traded goods. For simplicity, cross e¤ects between the reformed group of taxes/subsidies and the alternative revenue source are ruled out. Cross effects are reintroduced in the concluding subsection where the alternative revenue source is domestic taxation of nontraded goods.
Reform of Consumption Taxes and Production Subsidies
Let q denote the consumer price vector while denotes the producer price vector, all for the goods subject to tax reform. Typically the consumer of good i is taxed at rate q i i > 0 and a the producers of good i are subsidized at rate i i > 0: The pure import tax case arises when q i = i : For export taxes the inequalities are reversed and consumption is subsidized while production is taxed. The government budget constraint is given by
The private budget constraint is given by e(q; p; u) g( ; p) s = 0. Solve the government budget constraint for the endogenous value of p that satis…es the constraint given the values of q; ; u; then substitute the results into the private budget constraint to form the government cost function and the reduced form social budget constraint. Changes in distortions imply changes in the government cost function
Note that subsidy increases are cost increasing except in the highly perverse case where the cross e¤ects (in ( ) 0 g for production subsidies and (q p ) 0 efor consumption subsidies) are so large as to o¤set the other terms (arising when a subsidy increase shifts production so powerfully away from more highly subsidized industries that the subsidy budget actually falls). The increasing government cost associated almost everywhere with production or consumption subsidies argues for the desirability at the margin of leaning away from border taxes toward consumption taxes. Nevertheless, the administrative cost of instituting or levying producer taxes which e¤ectively lower the producer subsidy due to the tari¤ argue for caution in applying this advice. (See Emran and Stiglitz, 2005, for a strong statement of this view.)
The decomposition methods of this paper can be applied to consumption taxes and production subsidies straightforwardly. On the production subsidy side the decomposition is not really needed for reform rules, however, since virtually the entire subsidy space southeast of the initial subsidies is welfareimproving. Reductions of tari¤s paired with increases in consumption taxes such that consumer prices stay constant will achieve the desired decrease in production subsidies for constant q. Hatzipanayotou, Michael and Miller (1994) provide the basic result. Keen and Ligthart (2002) extend the result and show that it must be quali…ed upon the introduction of intermediate inputs and imperfect competition. The present treatment is slightly more general in that it allows for an endogenous change in a distortionary tax to meet the government revenue constraint.
Reform of consumption taxes is in contrast very much like trade taxes. De…ne the consumption tax on the domestic price base as T e = q 1 (q ): The generalized mean and generalized variance of consumption taxes are formed using the demand system substitution e¤ects. The consumption tax change rule dT q = (T)da causes government cost to change by
Note the close resemblance of this expression to (8) . The results of Propositions 2 and 3 (with the obvious extension to include cross e¤ects) thus apply to the reform of consumption taxation on traded goods. Except in perverse cases, production subsidy reduction is bene…cial in all directions.
Nontraded Goods Taxation
Finally, consider taxation of nontraded goods for the purpose of neutralizing the revenue e¤ects of tari¤ reform. It is convenient to assume once again that all other taxes are trade taxes (or subsidies). Thus primary factors are not taxed, but the formal analysis is much like that of the wage tax in the earlier sections of the paper. Let t denote the speci…c tax (which can be thought of as either a producer or a consumer tax) on the nontraded good with producer price p and consumer price p + t = q: The private budget constraint is given by e( ; p + t; u) g( ; p) s = 0 while the government budget constraint is given by ( ) 0 (e g ) + te q s = 0: Market clearance for nontraded goods determined p as a function of ; ; t; u; s : P ( ; ; t; u; s) = p : e q ( ; p + t; u) g p ( ; p) = 0: Solving the government budget constraint for t as a function of ; ; u; s and substituting into the private budget constraint yields the government cost function G( ; u; ; s):
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The marginal cost of a change in trade taxes is given by
P t = eeg pp :
The formal expressions for G 0 and M CF p feature a partial separation of substitution e¤ects between the demand side and the supply side of the economy as in the preceding subsection along with a reintroduction of cross e¤ects between the goods and the p good.
The reform results of preceding sections evidently apply when the alternative tax is on a nontraded good. Note once again that the condition M CF p < M CF T may sometimes not be met. Anderson (1999) provides a contrary example, but Erbil (2004) provides far more examples with more appropriate models and data for which the condition is met. Of course, for separable groups of traded goods it remains true that trade-weighted average preserving reductions in dispersion are welfare improving without quali…ca-tion: they raise revenue regardless of the ranking of M CF p and M CF T : Tax reform within sets of nontraded goods and factors is beyond the scope of this paper. The expression for M CF p indicates the di¢ culties which must be handled -P t becomes a matrix with complex structure.
Conclusion
This paper has set out cones of welfare improving trade reform that permit con…dent policy advice despite the (assumed partial) ignorance of analysts about the 'true'structure of the economy. Dispersion reducing trade reform is surprisingly widely bene…cial: whenever households have implicitly separable preferences with respect to the same partitions of goods, dispersion of tari¤s within separable groups is ine¢ cient. Cuts in average tari¤s are e¢ cient when the MCF of such tari¤s is greater than the MCF of alternative revenue sources. Convex combinations of uniform absolute cuts and mean-preserving dispersion cuts are bene…cial under these conditions.
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Appendix
The separable case gives rise to useful simpli…cations of the model. Here the logic is extended to many separable classes.
Suppose that the tari¤-ridden group of goods forms an implicitly separable class in the trade expenditure function: E( ; p; 0 ; u) = F [ ( ; u); p; 0 ; u]; where is concave and homogeneous of degree one in : When imported goods form separable classes indexed by k; such as k ( k ); the logic of the text yields T k = T ak with the natural extension of notation. Mean-preserving dispersion reduction is desirable within classes. When combined with overall uniform tari¤ change, the tari¤ change policy rule is given by
where is understood to be the vector of ones with dimension appropriate to goods class k and k is a scalar for goods class k: The combination of trade-weighted mean preserving change with uniform absolute change overall requires k = T ak + : As for overall mean tari¤s, we de…ne T a = P ! In the separable case with b constructed as given, the covariance is equal to zero. Covariation within class is obviously equal to zero because the elements of b within class do not vary. Between classes, the class-mean-preserving element of k implies no change in price aggregates while the mean shift element of k implies a uniform shift which gives no variation. Applying the other implications of the structure of b yields
The substitutions from the …rst to the second line also uses sT = 0 E = 1 1=M CF T and then simpli…es. When =M CF T < 1; dG=d > 0 when < 0: This is the case of uniform tari¤ increases combined with tradeweighted mean preserving dispersion increases, so such reductions improve welfare. Thus we have proved Proposition 3.
